Archive for the ‘politics’ Category
Here is every article that the Harvard Crimson ran between 1973 and 1976 that mentions the Khmer Rouge.
First, a note on the Crimson’s editorial conventions, from 1973:
Signed pieces appearing on The Crimson editorial page represent the opinion of their authors. Only unsigned editorials represent opinions of The Crimson staff.
Both the U.S. and the dictatorship of President Lon Nol claimed the crackling Cambodian war was being pressed by North Vietnamese regular army units, but several observers at the scene disagreed.
Although acknowledging the presence of Vietnamese in the country, they said the brunt of the onslaught against the Lon Nol regime was being shouldered by the Khmer Rouge, an indigenous revolutionary movement.
At any rate, Lon Nol is in trouble. Fighting is surging closer to his capital of Phnom Penh and all three highways into the city have been sliced by the guerrillas. His tottering regime will probably soon topple, barring another U.S. escalation.
If the American government were sincere about wanting peace in Cambodia, it would stop supporting a repressive dictatorship, and allow the people of Cambodia — represented by the Khmer Rouge and the supporters of the deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk — to determine their own destiny.
First of all, it is obvious that all the so-called factions are so united that Defense and State Department officials as well as American officials inside Cambodia itself have admitted consistently that had it not been for American air-power, “Government forces” would have collapsed.
Secondly, ever since 1970, the various armed forces as well as the people of Cambodia have been fighting under the one and only banner of the National United Front of Kampuchia (FUNK). FUNK has helped liberate about 90 per cent of the country, and the areas liberated have been under the sole administration of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (GRUNC). GRUNC has been led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk and is recognized by 33 governments around the world and last summer it was admitted to the conference of over 60 non-aligned nations in the world–convened at Georgetown, Guyana–as the sole legitimate government of Cambodia.
Moreover, as reported in the April 11, 13 and 14 issues of the Christian Science Monitor, Prince Sihanouk has recently emerged from a long extended tour of his country and has said that all the Khmer forces are united behind him. North Vietnam and China have also given Sihanouk full support. …
Americans who want to have this immoral war end once for all should not let Nixon intimidate them through the use of the returning POWs but should force Nixon to end all support for the Thieu, the Long Nol [sic] and the Phouma regimes and let the Indochinese peoples solve their own problems.
Here is Ngo Vinh Long’s backstory.
Congress and the public have come to accept that the U.S. must stop interfering in Cambodia’s affairs, which will surely result in well-deserved victory of the revolutionary forces led by Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.
Richard Nixon is informally on trial for his responsibility in the Watergate scandal. As witnesses parade before the Ervin Committee, spilling their tales of burglary, electronic eavesdropping, forgery and bribery, the public is judging how much Nixon is responsible for the crimes. If the judgement is harsh, he will most likely have to resign, pious pronouncements about the integrity of the presidency notwithstanding.
Crimes have most certainly been committed in the case. Yet they are laughably insignificant next to Nixon’s other–and admitted–crimes. These crimes, defined by international tribunals after the end of World War II, are known as war crimes, and Nixon has not stopped committing them. …
Reporting from Cambodia, with a handful of exceptions, has been much the same mixture of laziness and inaccuracy. The press gulped down Nixon’s story that the American bombing was directed against North Vietnamese invaders who were attempting to overrun the country. It believed him also when he said that only military targets were being hit, and that the aerial onslaught was intended only to prop up the tottering January peace agreements.
These claims are all lies. The bombing, as some reporting has started to show, is directed against an indigenous revolutionary movement, the Khmer Rouge, a force numbering in the hundreds of thousands which is attempting to topple the Lon Nol regime, Nixon’s two-year-old creation. The aerial war does not discriminate between military and civilian targets: indeed, there is no difference between the two in a people’s war. Nixon’s bombing is a crime against peace. It is the biggest single obstacle to an end of the war in Southeast Asia.
News of U.S. bombing in Cambodia drones on. U.S. support for political repression in Vietnam continues. … The burdens the world bore this year were no less painful, no less unwieldy than the threats to self-determination and human equality to which past years have made us accustomed. But local burdens seem heavier, because after years of radical protest and finally the defeat of even a liberal politician clearly better qualified than Richard Nixon to be President, national forums seem a less appropriate focus for change. …
The bombing, as some belated reporting from the area is starting to show, is directed against an indigenous Cambodian revolutionary movement, the Khmer Rouge, a force numbering in the hundreds of thousands which is attempting to topple the Lon Nol regime, Nixon’s two-year-old creation. …
For nearly a decade, The Crimson has called for an end to American involvement in Indochina. We repeat that call today. The war has brought more death and destruction to one area of the globe since Adolf Hitler’s armies devastated Europe in World War II. The United States should cease its bombing and all other overt and covert military operations in Indochina. The genocide must stop.
“The genocide must stop.” About that…
Reporting from Cambodia is scanty and shoddy, the outlines of the political dispute there are hazy, and the revolutionary Khmer Rouge, to which many Harvard students would be attracted, is still a shadowy and elusive force.
As a consequence, Watergate, which is close to home, has gripped students here as well as the rest of the nation while the more monstrous Nixon crimes go unnoticed.
Also in the article:
Mass murder, we were told, was the single most abhorrent feature in the programs of both the Nazis and of international Communism. Both systems practiced slaughter and butchery on a mass scale, and that was reason enough for opposing their advances. Even today, the handful of stalwarts who still defend America’s entry into Vietnam base their position on the alleged need to prevent the bloodbath that would inevitably follow a Communist takeover.
Increasing numbers of Americans, however, drew the opposite conclusion from the Vietnam war. As the conflict escalated and the body counts from Vietnam continued to mount, students, and others, began to apply this moral imperative against genocide to their own government. Even if the Vietnamese dead were all Communist automatons bent upon subverting liberty, and even if the American cause was initially just, the extent of the killing, the mounds of the dead, showed that the U.S. government was pursuing a policy of moral obscenity. No political goals were worth such a toll in lives. Why fight to avert a bloodbath if you create one in the process?
This aversion to mass murder of any sort, which grew with each year of the seemingly endless bombing, napalming and free-fire zones, explains why a growing number of people, eventually including a majority of the American population, called for withdrawal from Vietnam. The continuing carnage sickened even those on the moderate right, and the unity against the killing gradually broadened.
Much antiwar sentiment was based solely on this aversion to the killing, but some people, particularly students who had time to ponder such matters, started to search for an explanation for the Vietnamese resistance. In the face of a nearly total onslaught by the greatest military power in the world, why did these people continue fighting? Who were these Vietnamese, and why did they rebuild bridges with their bare hands and go into battle against an enemy that was vastly superior in the weapons of modern war? Why did they troop down the Ho Chi Minh trail, year after year, to face almost certain annihilation?
We gradually learned that the Vietnamese were fighting for many of the same things Americans had always been taught to cherish–independence, social justice and freedom. As our knowledge of the National Liberation Front and of North Vietnam grew, our political support for their cause expanded simultaneously. A new dimension of hatred for the American government surged up within us. No longer were the actions of the United States criminal merely because they unleashed indiscriminate violence against a smaller nation. Now, we saw those actions as criminal because the destruction was intended to annihilate a people who were striving against almost insuperable odds to achieve some measure of dignity and control over their own lives–ironically, objectives Americans have traditionally championed.
Vietnam became a symbol for us, proof that socialism could work, that people could master their own destiny. The Vietnamese revolutionaries seemed courageous and cooperative, almost superhuman. Socialist men and women stood in the rice fields and the high plateaus, calmly firing rifles skyward as American divebombers screamed down to engulf them in flaming destruction. Vietnam showed us that might can never subdue justice, that a people striving together to be free cannot be stopped short of genocide.
So we supported the National Liberation Front. We carried their flags, we applauded their victories, we honored their heroes. Some of us went so far as to see ourselves as fighting for them in the streets of America, a fifth column behind enemy lines. We awaited Vietnam’s inevitable victory.
Woodside and Thomson agreed that the Lon Nol government will eventually fall, giving way in all likelihood to a left-wing government headed by Sihanouk that will adopt an independent stance in foreign affairs.
“A Communist or Communist-leaning government will eventually come to power,” Thomson predicted. …
Woodside explained that the Khmer Rouge appear to be particularly strong in western Cambodia, the only area of the country that has big landed estates. “They also have European-educated urban intellectuals working for them,” he said.
Khmer Rouge revolutionaries last week pressed their assaults to within ten miles of the capital at Phnom Penh. Lon Nol has only 27 days left in power.
As in Cambodia, which will fall to the revolutionary Khmer Rouge shortly after the American bombing stops August 15, American foreign policy–even by its own inhumane logic–has failed once again.
Counting today, Lon Nol has little more than 16 days left in power. Both the American bomber pilots and Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge will be back home very very soon.
Criminal American air strikes, which have reached new peaks of barbarism in the past several weeks, will finally end at midnight tonight. A flurry of peace rumors is blowing out of Phnom Penh, Peking and Washington, but even a last minute face-saving settlement cannot disguise the fact that American imperialism has lost another one.
The bombing will stop, Lon Nol’s puppet strings will be cut, and Cambodia will eventually return to peace and national sovereignty under the leadership of the revolutionary Khmer Rouge. Lon Nol probably already has a mansion on the French Riviera picked out, where he can join other reactionary luminaries like Madame Nhu and a host of South Vietnamese generals.
Newspaper owners are integral to the American elite, molders and managers of its policy. They can hardly be expected to question their own behavior.
Not all American newspapers adhere to this don’t-rock-the-boat view of their business; a few have a more liberal view of the world, a more aggressive and combative concept of journalism. These papers–The New York Times, The Washington Post, among others–are about the closest to responsible and serious journalism that the American press has to offer. Although they are also owned and run by wealthy families, they are powers in their own right and often unafraid to cross those in positions of authority. It is no mistake that the Bernsteins and the Woodwards and the Hershs work for them.
But The Times and The Post are not perfect. They sometimes succumb to the same shoddiness that plagues the rest of the newspaper world, and some of their coverage is just as inaccurate. The Times, for example, insists to this day upon calling the Vietnamese National Liberation Front the “Viet Cong,” even though the term is considered highly insulting in Vietnam. A newspaper striving honestly for objectivity would report the news objectively and evenly, leaving its insults for the editorial page.
Salvador Allende, the president of Chile, is always “Marxist President Allende” in these newspapers, yet they fail to make the logical extension–“Capitalist President Nixon.” Also, the NLF are always “Communist snipers,” which is not strictly true because they are not all “Communists.” At any rate, these phrases should be accompanied by something like “Capitalist war planes” or, at the very least, “Free Enterprise war planes.” One can be thankful for small favors, however; at least these papers have for the most part stopped calling the Khmer Rouge or the NLF “the enemy.”
Nixon and Kissinger took office in 1969 with an implicit electoral mandate for peace. Instead of ending the war as they had promised they continued it for four more long hard years, doubling American casualties, murdering hundreds of thousands more with bombs and napalm, devastating previously untouched areas of Indochina, gaining nothing — even by their own perverted logic — by the prolongation of the agony.
To mask their deceptions, Nixon and Kissinger lied to the American people. They lied about the one and one-half year secret bombing of Cambodia. They lied about the reasons for the 1970 invasion of that country — and they lied when they said the just-ended bombing of Cambodia was intended to stop a North Vietnamese invasion, when in fact it was directed against the indigenous Khmer Rouge.
The blood of dead and homeless Indochinese is on Kissinger’s hands. He has no place anywhere in the United States government.
Few men have been so obviously unqualified to be president of the United States as Richard Nixon. Perhaps in the past men of lesser talent have occupied the post, but they held it in times when the demands of the job were not so great. Among presidents, Nixon holds the unhappy distinction of being the most disastrously incompetent. He should either leave or be removed from office.
The terror bombing of Indochina is in itself sufficient to make toppling the Nixon regime morally imperative. The continued bombing of the Khmer Rouge right up until the Congressionally imposed August 15 deadline betrayed any attempt of Nixonian “statesmanship” to rationalize its murders, and conclusively demonstrated the vicious insanity long buried in Nixon’s psychology.
The crimes in Indochina were so brutal and monstrous that there is probably not enough compassion and courage in America to ever come to terms with them.
He’s not talking about the crimes of the Khmer Rouge; he’s talking about the American war against the Khmer Rouge.
The White House confirmed yesterday that President Nixon sent a personal letter to Cambodian president Lon Nol pledging that the United States would “stand side by side” with the Cambodian government, which is currently facing renewed military offensive by the revolutionary Khmer Rouge.
Reports from Cambodia last week merely confirmed what has been long suspected: The United States is still heavily involved in illegal military support of the foundering Lon Nol regime–a blatant violation of Congressional action which bars military advisers and the direct involvement of any American troops in Southeast Asia.
Although the U.S. military attache in Phnom Penh denied any illegal activity, first hand press reports verified that at least one American officer was working in the field as a combat adviser and, for all intents and purposes, commander for the badly demoralized and disorganized government troops in Kampot, a key coastal outpost about 80 miles south of Phnom Penh. …
Congress must do more than police and publicize violations of the Cooper-Church amendment. Last week the Nixon administration asked Congress for $850 million in economic aid–an increase of over $200 million from last year–and at least the same $106 billion given in military aid last year to support the unpopular dictatorships and prevent Southeast Asia “from going Communist.” [sic]
Congress should cut off all military aid to the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes and bring all United States military personnel home, allowing the United Nations forces to ensure that the people of Southeast Asia can choose their governments with no outside pressure. Only then will the American people be sure that the Pentagon and the White House are not blatantly defying the laws passed by Congress.
Recent reports from Cambodia indicate that living conditions under the faltering Lon Nol regime have become particularly grim and are likely to worsen if the U.S. maintains the current stalemate there. The problem for the U.S. is not a question of “mopping up” a messy aftermath of the war in Southeast Asia; it is a question of renouncing a policy of belligerent imperialism and cutting off aid to the head of the Phnom Penh government–Lon Nol. …
As in so many areas, the U.S. holds the key to peace and progress in Cambodia. In the absence of American dollars and other forms of continued intervention it seems probable that the Lon Nol regime would fall almost immediately. While the Khmer Rouge provides no guarantee of building a model democraic socialist state in Cambodia, they constitute a definite progressive alternative to the current regime. Cutting all American aid is the necessary first step out of the current stalemate.
We are involved in a war [in Cambodia] where we have no business, and we are not even supporting the right side.
Chris Daly went on to spend ten years at the Associated Press. After that, he became an associate professor at Boston University.
The regime now rests on a single pillar; the daily American airlift of rice and ammunition into Phnom Penh. American experts and policy-makers are unanimous in their opinion that Phnom Penh would fall almost immediately to the Khmer Rouge without the airlift.
What did the Crimson want done? The title of the article is “Cut the Aid”. So they wanted Phnom Penh to fall to the Khmer Rouge “almost immediately”.
Reports now filtering to the West [from Vietnam] talk of “communists” slaughtering innocent refugees from the central highlands abandoned by Thieu last week. But these reports are still incomplete; this latest bloodshed may well stem from the traditionally vicious rivalry between the Montangard highland tribes and the Vietnamese people rather than from deliberate policies of the PRG.
While there is little information about the Khmer Rouge revolutionaries in Cambodia, they now control almost the entire country, and their support is increasing. Sydney Schanberg’s reports in The New York Times of corruption in the Lon Nol government make it clear that the forces opposed to Lon Nol’s policies are fighting for the people of Cambodia.
The capture of Phnom Penh last week by the Khmer Rouge is a victory for the Cambodian people over the corrupt Lon Nol regime and the imperialist American policies that supported it. When the Lon No 1 [sic] government surrendered, Khmer Rouge and former government troops embraced, signalling an end to the suffering of the Cambodian people after five long years of war. The new Cambodian government holds out the hope of social reform and simple honesty that were absent under Lon No 1. [sic] For that reason alone, those in this country who support national self-determination for Cambodia should consider the success of the Khmer Rouge as a cause for celebration.
The victory of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front is a victory, first of all, for the people of Vietnam. Americans, who played a crucial role in forcing their government to withdraw from Indochina, should rejoice in the Vietnamese triumph. …
The thousands of refugees spawned by 30 years of war–seeking escape from bombings, marches and retreats, free-fire zones and protective-reaction strikes; or ripped untimely from their homes by “strategic-hamlet” programs and “forced-draft urbanization’s”–will start to go back to their homes now. The Montagnard tribesmen, alternately cajoled and maltreated by a Saigon administration uninterested in their problems or their culture, will begin to live with a government with at least some commitment to fighting traditional Vietnamese varieties of racism.
Vietnam’s farmers, and its farmers-turned soldiers, will go back to growing rice and raising pigs, probably on lands no longer owned by large landlords and with the beginnings of co-operative labor. The celebrated Vietnamese orphans–from a country where there was hardly a word for “orphan” until massive American intervention strained Vietnamese families’ traditional generosity beyond its capacity for resilience–will grow up peacefully. These children of the war, the “nieces and nephews” to whom Ho Chi Minh directed his last testament, will once again find a secure place in a secure social fabric. And because that fabric is no longer continually frayed by rifle-fire, members of every social class will at last be able to go about their business in peace. City workers, businessmen and shopkeepers, even Saigon government employees (many of them have apparently been kept on by the Provisional Revolutionary Government)–all will benefit from freedom from the specter of bombs and rockets, and from having a government with wide popular support, committed to equality and to industrial and agricultural development.
We hope and believe that there will be no “bloodbath” in Vietnam. …
To ask people to remember Vietnam is hardly to call for unwarranted “recriminations,” as administration spokesmen have been suggesting in the last few days. If, as they seem to believe, American involvement in Vietnam was an accident, a mistake that unfortunately killed hundreds of thousands of people without achieving a discernible political effect-except, perhaps, for promoting the victory of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia-then it is reasonable to continue to ask how a democratic, rational system of government could permit such an accident and such a mistake. And if American involvement in Vietnam was not simply an “accident”-if it had deeper roots, in the economic and political structure of the United States and in the ideas to which this structure gave rise-then it is reasonable to try to identify these roots, before they bring forth new flowers somewhere else.
While Harvard lulled in the calm of slow change and little protest this past year, the world saw dramatic triumph for the people of Vietnam. Our focus was turned away from the important issues at Harvard when, after thirty years of relentless fighting–and twenty years when the United States was the enemy–the National Liberation Front marched into Saigon victorious in its longstanding struggle for independence. And in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge won in its fight against the corrupt Lon Nol regime after five years of fighting.
Also in the article:
One of the lessons of Vietnam that Ford would like to ignore is that more than two decades of repression by a series of corrupt regimes supported by the U.S. could not stifle the will of the Vietnamese people. Even though more than a million people died as a result of the American policy, its failure spoke–more eloquently than any polemic against the PRG–for the inadequacy of terror as a political weapon.
U.S. support for Gen. Pinochet’s junta in Chile shows that Ford refuses to learn this lesson. Portugal provides still another example of the will of the people, in the form of a revolution ending 45 years of Fascism, over-coming the will of a few in power. Programs of nationalization are a welcome step toward economic equality, and we support Portugal’s progress toward democratic socialism.
The will of the people! Democratic socialism! But how did the revolution work out for Portugal?
There are reports that in the countryside all movement across provincial boundaries in prohibited and that in some provinces possession of the old Cambodian currency, the rien, is punishable by death. According to the New York Times, one high ranking official administering the province of Battambang recently said that “the law now is the law of the soldier, the law of the gun.”
These reports are sporadic and they can not reflect the complete truth about the situation in Cambodia. If they are true, these actions must be condemned. The new government of Cambodia may have to resort to strong measures against a few to gain democratic socialism for all Cambodians. And we support the United Front [i.e. the Khmer Rouge] in the pursuit of its presently stated goals.
As for the motivations:
Since the U.S. incursion into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, and the subsequent saturation-bombings The Crimson has supported the Khmer Rouge in its efforts to form a revolutionary government in that country. But for the past 3 years, little or no information about the Khmer Rouge reached the West
In the vacuum of information we made certain assumptions about the Khmer Rouge that in retrospect, were illusory. Because the Khmer Rouge had ties with the Republic of China, it was assumed that the Khmer Rouge’s policies and social programs would have affinities with Maoism. It was assumed that while the NLF was working at grass roots campaigns to reform land use and to set up village councils, the Khmer Rouge was working on similar projects in their own country. But most important of all, it was assumed that because the Khmer Rouge fought against the forces of Lon Nol’s regime and stood up against troops and brutal American bombing raids–symbols of American imperiallsm–that it was a good and courageous revolutionary movement.
(Note the passive voice: “it was assumed.”)
The Crimson supported the Khmer Rouge for three reasons:
- The Crimson thought the Khmer Rouge would act Maoist.
- The Crimson thought the Khmer Rouge was going to work on the type of project that the NLF (the Viet Cong) was working on. In other words, the Crimson thought the Khmer Rouge would have similar politics to the Viet Cong.
- The Crimson thought it was a “good and courageous revolutionary movement” because it was against “symbols of American imperialism”.
From this we can learn that the Harvard Crimson supported Maoism, the Viet Cong, and revolution, and opposed Lon Nol and American imperialism.
What was happening in Vietnam and Cambodia meant a lot to us at The Crimson; for us it seemed to be the first good news from Indochina in years. Since late in the 60s we had editorially supported the Khmer Rouge and National Liberation Front in Vietnam, both nationalist groups affiliated with foreign Communist parties, and both of those characteristics–the independence and the socialist egalitarianism–appealed to us. …
It’s easier to step back a little, and try to understand why the Khmer Rouge was worth supporting, before figuring out whether it still is. A few general principles seem to apply: a state of peace is better than one of war; a state of independence is better than one of control from outside; a state of complete social and economic equality for a nation’s citizens is better than one of inequality. The United States monstrously violated this value system in Indochina, lining up squarely and brutally on the wrong side of all three criteria. All the Indochinese liberation movements seemed to uphold and sustain these same values; they were firmly in the right. …
At first The Crimson was against the war because it was a bad and wasteful thing for America to do; supporting the liberation movements, a step most of the anti-war movement didn’t take, was for us a logical next step.
I don’t know what we all expected the Khmer Rouge to do when it came to power. …
With Cambodia it’s an old dilemma–do we look at events in Indochina as Americans with liberal values or as the Indochinese must look at them? The Khmer Rouge can certainly no longer meet with our approval on our own terms, because they violate our feeling that anything worthy need not be accomplished through violence and cruelty. On their own terms they continue to be most of what we supported them for–staunch nationalists, socialists, remakers of their own society. It is a conflict that I am not ready to resolve. Although The Crimson has yet to commit itself, I continue to support the Khmer Rouge in its principles and goals but I have to admit that I deplore the way they are going about it.
Lemann was, at one point, president of the Crimson. He graduated in 1976. If he was president in his senior year, he was probably responsible for the previous unsigned article.
After graduating, he worked his way up in the journalistic establishment, from the Washington Monthly to the Texas Monthly to the Washington Post to the New York Times, where, in 1995, he wrote a ten-page article singing the praise of Patrick Chavis, the affirmative action poster doctor whose license was suspended in 1997 for malpractice after he killed a patient in a botched liposuction—a procedure for which he was not trained.
Lemann later became the dean of the journalism school at Columbia, and married Judith Shulevitz, an op-ed writer for the New York Times. They have both written for Slate and The New Republic.
The press treatment of Cambodia since the fall of the Lon Nol regime last April is a prime example of news distortion. An editorial last summer in The New York Times, titled “Cambodia’s Crime,” summed up the official view of events there. It spoke of millions of people from Phnom Penh and other cities “forced by the Communists at gunpoint to walk into the countryside without organized provision for food, shelter, physical security, or medical care.” It concluded that Cambodia “resembles a giant prison camp with the urban supporters of the former regime now being worked to death on thin gruel and hard labor…the barbarous cruelty of the Khmer Rouge can be compared to Soviet extermination of the Kulaks or with the Gulag Archipalego.” …
This lurid interpretation of events in Cambodia seems designed to shock readers and increase their fear of socialism.
He goes by Lee Penn now. At least he gave up the Maoism.
Chomsky said that Indonesia started taking over the eastern half of Timor in 1975, and has since killed about as many inhabitants of the island as the Khmer Rouge has killed in Cambodea [sic], in an island with a fraction of Cambodia’s population, Chomsky said.
Vietnamese troops captured the last urban stronghold of the defeated Cambodian government’s forces, but the retreating soldiers struck back in isolated attacks and set up mountain and island guerilla bases to carry on the war, Thai sources said yesterday.
“We will fight until we die,” one of the Cambodian loyalists near the Thai border reportedly said. …
Reports said 10 battalions of “Khmer Krom”–Cambodians who have resided in southern Vietnam–had recently been moved into Cambodia and might serve as occupation troops in an effort to present the war as strictly a Cambodian affair.
The official media of the new Phnom Penh government claimed people throughout Cambodia rejoiced at the downfall of the Pol Pot government–an ouster engineered by the Vietnamese, neighbors for whom Cambodians have a deep-seated historical hatred.
Famine has plagued Cambodia since Vietnamese forces invaded last December and overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime. The refusal of the current Heng Samrin regime to send food to supporters of ex-Premier Pol Pot has complicated international relief efforts. …
Speaking at a slide presentation yesterday. Stephen B. Young, assistant dean at the Law School, compared the Cambodian tragedy to the Nazi Holocaust. “If they were European whites, there would be an uproar,” he said.
Which tragedy? The famine, presumably: that’s what the rest of the article is talking about. The famine that has plagued Cambodia since Vietnamese forces invaded and overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime. (Since?)
The Crimson finally turned around in 1981, but by then, Reagan was president.
In 2010, a conservative Crimson columnist acknowledged that the paper had once supported the Khmer Rouge.
“Inclusive conservatism” attempts to harmonize conservative principles with certain progressive policy goals:
Firstly, we should be reluctant to throw out traditions, but we should be very determined to engage with them. Sincere engagement with tradition isn’t possible in a society that treats its own fundamental principles as so fragile they cannot survive questioning; it also isn’t possible in a society that alienates all its own members who don’t fit the existing system, or a society that doesn’t give people a chance to realize whether or not the system is in fact what will empower them most. People picking-apart-why-an-expectation-doesn’t-work-for-them is a valuable form of inquiry and, ideally, there should be space within the system for that form of inquiry; if it’s all coming from outside it’ll prompt defensiveness instead of introspection. …
Excluding gay people from marriage was clinging, I believe, to an element of tradition that didn’t matter; mixing up the trappings and the content. But the content is good; the community has an interest in ensuring that co-parents of children have a healthy constructive relationship and that the children have a stable home. Inclusive conservativism would be about critiquing marriage with that content in mind, and trying to figure out how to let our traditions grow.
I used the word “let our traditions grow”, and that was deliberate. Changing traditions is hard; they come across as artificial, you sometimes do more damage than you intend. I think of it as the equivalent of digging up a thousand-year-old tree and replanting it somewhere you think it’s needed more. If you know what you’re doing and have a lot of resources, it can be done, but more often than not you’ll kill the tree.
What you want to do instead is to shape the way the branches grow. It’s hard to mess up catastrophically. It’s possible to achieve amazing results. And no one who was dependent on shade where the old tree stood gets screwed over. It’s slower, and takes finesse, and it genuinely takes longer and doesn’t accomplish as much as digging the whole damn thing out of the ground – I’m not going to pretend traditionalism doesn’t have real costs! And those costs fall disproportionately on marginalized people and inclusive conservativism really does need to answer for that. But in the end, we have a thousand-year-old tree learning to stretch its branches in fascinating new directions, and you have a substantial probability of a dead tree.
Inclusive conservatism is, of course, just conservatism—the word does not imply a belief in preserving tradition qua tradition, as is demonstrated by the distinctly leftward position of today’s conservatives to the past’s, but instead a belief that a tradition is an aggregation of the wisdom as well as the follies of the past, that the tree should not be dug up. The conservative, whose movement places a Whig at the head of its canon, does not believe in preservation or revolution, but in reform.
But inclusive conservatism is not just conservatism. Conservatism at its best rejects the rationalism implied in the label inclusive: its claims about grand, sweeping policies are purely negative. The conservative (unlike the neocon) does not believe that ‘this is how we all ought to do things’ for any value of ‘this’, does not take a stance one way or the other on how the whole world ought to behave—except that it ought to set up structures, unencumbered by any predetermined conclusions unnecessary to their survival, for finding out what works and what does not. The essence of conservatism, long lost to the demands of democracy, is the refusal to claim to know anything from any source other than experience—which leads necessarily to federalism, to structures that allow experimentation. Let one state do one thing and another do another, let the American revolutionaries perform their Great Experiment, and gather the data as it comes in.
Inclusive conservatism does none of this. Instead, it says:
Lots of my friends have intense allergies to all of the above, because they were the people who didn’t benefit from that style of encouragement, or who couldn’t (with any amount of guidance) grow into the sort of person those traditions encouraged, or who didn’t want to, and most traditionalism is relentlessly terrible to those people; at best, it makes it so there’s a very high cost of leaving.
A useful traditional/conservative outlook needs to be more than just sympathetic to those people; it needs to have something to offer them.
A conservatism that begins with the belief that a certain sort of demand must be met no matter what is not conservatism at all: its conclusions are written at the outset, and all it concerns itself with is the implementation. Let there be a conservatism that believes that it is impossible for the costs of meeting the demands of outliers to outweigh the rewards—and let there be a conservatism that believes there must be a king.
But there is a further error.
Imagine a mathematical equation. It has an outward appearance—the graph that it generates—and it has an inward logic—the equation itself. A small change in the outward appearance, a difference in a tiny range, could require a dramatic change in the equation. A sine wave and a triangle wave look alike, but they are generated by completely different equations; a sine wave that becomes a triangle wave within a certain range is generated by a different equation still, no matter how small the range may be. And a small change in the inward logic may generate a completely different outward appearance: the sine and tangent functions are, in a sense, alike, but their graphs are not alike at all.
Or consider a myth: one small change in the form can open up completely different new interpretations or shut off old ones. We are all familiar with the traditional Christian narrative of the Fall of Man; and in it, the fruit is either left unspecified or considered to be an apple. There is some set of meanings that this narrative may have—but if the forbidden fruit is specified to be wheat, as it is in the Yazidi telling and as some rabbis have argued in favor of, a completely different interpretation is allowed for: it could be about the origin of agriculture.
Traditions, like equations and myths, can be separated into these two parts—and, again like equations, it is usually difficult to find the inward logic from the outward appearance alone. A Voltorb is a simple shape, but can you derive from it a Voltorb-like curve? And, again like equations and myths, a small change in the outward appearance can imply a great change in the inward logic. Marriage as institutional acknowledgment of romantic love displaces marriage as a business transaction, marriage as the joining of two instances of two complementary types into one unit, marriage as the formation of a household, marriage as a step toward the formation of a family, marriage as a permanent covenant with God and a necessary precondition for exaltation, and all the other views of the same institution that could exist—without bringing about any immediate changes in the outward appearance of the institution. But a different underlying logic brings about a different frame from which to evaluate and judge both the institution itself and other institutions in the same culture. If marriage is merely institutional acknowledgment of romantic love, there is no reason not to allow same-sex marriage or no-fault divorce; if marriage, still an expected part of the life script, is merely institutional acknowledgment of romantic love, romantic love must be a highly valuable thing to be sought out; and so on.
This is not to say that the outward appearances of traditions are, at any given time, merely reflections of their underlying premises and principles. That view fails to take into account historical inertia. There was, after all, a time when the purpose of marriage was considered to be institutional acknowledgment of romantic love—institutional acknowledgment of a certain arrangement of brain-states that same-sex couples can enter into—and yet marriage was still considered to be something that only opposite-sex couples could enter into. The important point is that the underlying logic determines the historical vectors of the outward forms. This principle can be seen in the case of marriage, and also in the case of the development of noun class systems in the Bantu languages:
In the Bantu languages, gender 1/2 is typically for nouns denoting humans. Swahili, however, is just completing a change which makes gender 1/2 the gender for all animates. Some other languages are at various stages in this development. We should examine how changes of this type are set off. Lunda, a Bantu language of Angola, assigns all animates to gender 1/2, while the closely related language Luvale has only a few non-human animates in this gender. They include muumbe ‘jackal’. Greenberg suggests that jackal is treated in this way because a personified jackal often appears in folk tales. Once there are exceptions to the requirement that nouns must denote humans to be in gender 1/2, the rule is weakened over time to include all animates (as has happened in Lunda). The development depends on nouns like ‘jackal’, which we shall term ‘Trojan horses’, since they get into the closed gender for special reasons, but then open the door for many more nouns of the same type (animates in this case) which are not special cases.
For the Bantu languages, it seems, the choice is not simply between a gender 1/2 that only includes humans and a gender 1/2 that includes humans and jackals: it is between a gender 1/2 that only includes humans and a gender 1/2 that, after the introduction of exceptions to the logic behind it, expands to include all animates. (The apparent exception of Luvale is irrelevant here for two reasons. First, statistical likelihood matters: one change may not be certain to lead to other changes, but it may still be likely to, and likelihood is still important. Second, related languages often undergo the same changes at different rates. The Germanic languages, for example, all simplified the clusters hl hr hn hw to l r n w, in some cases independently: so the Proto-Germanic form *hwat gives German was, Dutch and Frisian wat, Danish hvad (with a silent h), and English what. But this change must have happened at different times in different languages: English preserved the wh–w contrast until a few decades ago, and some dialects still have it, whereas the merger is attested in one of the first known sentences in Old Dutch.)
So the element of the tradition of marriage that specified that marriages must be opposite-sex is not necessarily a mere trapping, an inconsequential thing whose presence or absence has no effect on the rest of the institution. The presence of same-sex marriage sends the message that the underlying logic of marriage allows it; the absence of same-sex marriage sends the message that the underlying logic of marriage prohibits it. While it is often difficult to uncover the precise logic underlying a set of surface forms (as one can easily learn from any linguistics paper, to continue the analogy), the shift toward same-sex marriage coincides with a collapse in the institution of marriage. Since “the community has an interest in ensuring that co-parents of children have a healthy constructive relationship and that the children have a stable home”, it ought to be concerning that over forty percent of the births in America are to unmarried women.
(Marriage, of course, does not exist in a vacuum. If my first pass over the question of underlying marriage is accurate and marriage is about institutional recognition of romantic love, the logic there is obviously connected to the highly unusual emphasis that contemporary Western culture places on romantic love.)
The natural question to ask here is: since structures better able to meet the aforementioned goals are historically attested—since some structures made it much more likely that parents had a healthy constructive relationship and provided the children with a stable home—what are they? What are the logics of marriage that do not lead to a dramatic rise in the number of unmarried mothers? And how can they be recovered? (The other natural question is that of idealism vs. materialism: was it a change in the underlying economic or technological base of society that took us from there to here? Is such a change locking us here now, and if so, what can be done about that?)
Whatever they are, they did not include gay marriage—and that may not have been a bug.
The usage of making a trysting-place of the church by young men and young women was so universal that only moralists were scandalized by it. The virtuous Christine de Pisan makes a lover say in all simplicity: “Se souvent vais ou moustier, / C’est tout pour veoir la belle / Fresche comme rose nouvelle.”
The Church suffered more serious profanation than the little love services of a young man who offered his fair one the “pax,” or knelt by her side. According to the preacher Menot, prostitutes had the effrontery to come there in search of customers. Gerson tells that even in the churches and on festival days obscene pictures were sold tanquam idola Belphegor, which corrupted the young, while sermons were ineffective to remedy this evil.
As to pilgrimages, moralists and satirists are of one mind; people often go “pour folle plaisance.” The Chevalier de la Tour Landry naïvely classes them with profane pleasures, and he entitles one o fhis chapters, “of those who are fond of going to jousts and on pilgrimages.”
On festal days, exclaims Nicolas de Clemanges, people go to visit distant churches, not so much to redeem a pledge of pilgrimage as to give themselves up to pleasure. Pilgrimages are the occasions of all kinds of debauchery; procuresses are always found there, people come for amorous purposes. It is a common incident in the Quinze Joyes de Mariage; the young wife, who wants a change, makes her husband believe that the baby is ill, because she has not yet accomplished her vow of pilgrimage, made during her confinement. The marriage of Charles VI with Isabella of Bavaria was preceded by a pilgrimage. It is far from surprising that the serious followers of the devotio moderna called the utility of pilgrimages in question. Those who often go on pilgrimages, says Thomas à Kempis, rarely become saints. One of his friends, Frederick of Heilo, wrote a special treatise, Contra peregrinantes.
— J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages
Was there ever a time when the obvious unprincipled exceptions weren’t frequently made? If you still have any doubt, go read the Decameron and the Canterbury Tales.
In addition to the reasons why engaging in certain actions is wrong (for example, promiscuity spreads STDs and cheating in a marriage is a breach of contract), there are reasons why talking about engaging in those actions is wrong.
For example: most people want to get laid, and getting laid signals ability to get laid, which correlates well with certain forms of status. If there’s no prohibition against talking about it, well, it correlates well with certain forms of status, so it can become a form of status in itself—as we see today, with the notch count.
(The sort of casual sex that the current status system incentivizes is often not worth the effort required to get it if you ignore status concerns, which you don’t. It’s like taking care of your lawn. Not even the PUAs go out and try to find a new girl every night: the reluctant breakup with a local girl is not an uncommon theme.)
There is apparently a story somewhere in one of the Islamic traditions (I wish I could find it again; it went around on Tumblr a few years ago) about exactly this: the moral is that it’s worse to talk about sin than to actually sin, because it normalizes it in the eyes of others and leads them astray.
I was reading the Wikipedia article for a city in Canada, and this jumped out at me:
According to Statistics Canada’s Juristat reports (1993–2007), the metropolitan area reports an average homicide rate of approximately 1.15 per 100,000 population; an average of two homicides per year. An all-time high rate of 2.27 was reported in 1993 (four homicides).
I’ve known for a while that America is not a civilized country, but sometimes the point gets driven home. The county where I grew up has a homicide rate of about 11 per 100,000 — and that’s nowhere near the all-time high.
Scott Aaronson writes:
I spent my formative years—basically, from the age of 12 until my mid-20s—feeling not “entitled,” not “privileged,” but terrified. I was terrified that one of my female classmates would somehow find out that I sexually desired her, and that the instant she did, I would be scorned, laughed at, called a creep and a weirdo, maybe even expelled from school or sent to prison. You can call that my personal psychological problem if you want, but it was strongly reinforced by everything I picked up from my environment: to take one example, the sexual-assault prevention workshops we had to attend regularly as undergrads, with their endless lists of all the forms of human interaction that “might be” sexual harassment or assault, and their refusal, ever, to specify anything that definitely wouldn’t be sexual harassment or assault. I left each of those workshops with enough fresh paranoia and self-hatred to last me through another year. …
Of course, I was smart enough to realize that maybe this was silly, maybe I was overanalyzing things. So I scoured the feminist literature for any statement to the effect that my fears were as silly as I hoped they were. But I didn’t find any. On the contrary: I found reams of text about how even the most ordinary male/female interactions are filled with “microaggressions,” and how even the most “enlightened” males—especially the most “enlightened” males, in fact—are filled with hidden entitlement and privilege and a propensity to sexual violence that could burst forth at any moment.
Here we see a disease of the faculties that we do not have the language to distinguish from reason: the faculties of speech and of being spoken to, of internalizing ideographies and being acted upon by them.
Here we also see that these faculties can be counterproductive:
All this time, I faced constant reminders that the males who didn’t spend months reading and reflecting about feminism and their own shortcomings—even the ones who went to the opposite extreme, who engaged in what you called “good old-fashioned ass-grabbery”—actually had success that way. The same girls who I was terrified would pepper-spray me and call the police if I looked in their direction, often responded to the crudest advances of the most Neanderthal of men by accepting those advances.
It is noteworthy that the scientific method, the most successful method for discovering reality, only arose once, a few hundred years ago, in an environment where the goddess of war and wisdom demanded it. It is also noteworthy that the goddess of war is the goddess of wisdom: without an incentive-structure that demands accuracy, stump-orators will peddle sham-accuracy, pure speech detached from action.
It is, of course, possible for the drives that the stump-orators implant in their listeners to outweigh the drive to win: that is what we see above.
The faculty of speech is most often used socially: for coordination, for the alignment of reactions of praise and disgust. To be pwned is to be aligned with an institutional intelligence whose interests run opposite to yours—and where could this alignment come from but speech?
(This should not be taken as an endorsement of atomistic individualism. It is almost universal for people to value the survival of their family and their greater phyletic continuities—in many cases, more than their own lives. Without this, the computation-engine of war would not function, and civilization would have neither cause nor reason to exist.)
What is necessary, then, is exit from stump-oration—but how can this be brought about? Here’s how Scott Aaronson escaped from orator-paralysis:
I got older, and after years of hard work, I achieved some success in science, and that success boosted my self-confidence (at least now I had something worth living for), and the newfound confidence, besides making me more attractive, also made me able to (for example) ask a woman out, despite not being totally certain that my doing so would pass muster with a committee of radfems chaired by Andrea Dworkin—a prospect that was previously unthinkable to me. This, to my mind, “defiance” of feminism is the main reason why I was able to enjoy a few years of a normal, active dating life, which then led to meeting the woman who I married.
Except he didn’t.
That I managed to climb out of the pit with my feminist beliefs mostly intact, you might call a triumph of abstract reason over experience.
A triumph of abstract reason over experience is a triumph of stump-oration over experience. Without experience, there is no optimization engine; unless reason is subordinated in some sense to some form of experience (reasoning from observations, as Steve Sailer does; embedding in a structure that demands accuracy, as scientists and governments at war do; or seeking the best ideas to live by, as many in this corner of the internet do), whence accuracy?
One problem with an overactive faculty for orative coordination is the above anxiety. Anxiety in general is often a distortion of what we sometimes call the rational faculties, but more often call the rationalism of the nerd or the Vulcan: those of internal reasoning and of orative coordination from outside. Reason can be flawed in predictable and counterproductive directions, or System 2 disgust reactions can be implanted that are flawed in the same ways.
It follows from this that the cure is action—but how can these broken faculties be escaped?
It would be pointless to attempt to summarize what must be experienced. But the warrior-poets of war-era Italy hacked open a door from within. From Fiume to Futurist poetry, oration provides an exit from itself.
It’s not Christmas yet, so I can still write—as I’ve done in the past.
The reserve of mental energy left to me by five hours on a Chinatown bus with no wifi has turned toward the subject of Christmas songs—both because I haven’t heard many of them this year (given the unfortunate but probably inevitable lack of caroling groups to join in Manhattan) and because at least one of them has been deemed problematic.
Elite opinion says that Baby, It’s Cold Outside is the worst and most evil Christmas song of all time. This is because elite opinion is shaped by the young and provincial, and the past is a foreign country. “What would my mother/father/brother/sister/aunt think? At least I’m gonna say that I tried.”
No, the actual worst Christmas song is It’s Beginning to Look a Lot Like Christmas.
A pair of Hop-a-long boots and a pistol that shoots
Is the wish of Bonny and Ben
Dolls that will talk and go for a walk
Is the hope of Janice and Jenn
And mom and dad can hardly wait
For school to start again
The theme of how awful family gatherings are is a common one, and one probably rooted less in reality than in the ability of a constructed worldview to force people into roles without making them realize they’re acting. Consider the torrent of Thanksgiving articles about how to deal with that one awful Obamacare denier at dinner, or the trope of the ‘racist uncle’, or the last two lines above. “The wonderful and benevolent state will free us from the burdens that are our children!”
The Confucian emphasis on social units that is arising from some parts of the Right is already one of the most interesting things to happen in political (or, more properly, apolitical) thought this century. It has become noticeable that progressivism is an atomizing force, one that depends on the breakdown of the family and the pair-bond. It has also become noticeable that breaking down these units generally has negative effects.
Another thing that has become noticeable is that a lot of people don’t like Christmas carols. I suspect this is because of their secular and commercialized nature, with very little religious or ritual element to them. The Christmas season is the time of year when we all are exhorted to consume—has become such a time, has become secularized.
The secularization of a certain brand of Christianity is one of Mencius Moldbug’s most controversial claims. The secularization of Christmas must be taken as evidence in its favor: it demonstrates that there is pressure in that direction.
I wonder: could this secularization be traced over time? Could a history be written of it? Quantified from Christmas songs, maybe?
Anyway, the best piece of Christmas music is still God Rest Ye Merry, Gentlemen. I have no interesting argument here; I just like it.
Silent Night is also good, and here’s Insane Clown Posse’s producer singing it.
I had planned to drop everything else during trade school and focus, but it turns out that New York won’t let me.
In lieu of a normal post, here’s what I’ve been thinking about over the past few months.
1. What makes thedes and phyles form? I have my own suspicions here (revolving around not only scarcity-motivated competition, but also processes of interfacing and levels of cognitive effort required for it… and it occurs to me now that local status-systems may also play a role, in both the sense that the existence of multiple phyles may allow for a less unequal distribution of status / allow more access to higher status and the related sense that people can self-select into status-systems that better fit or serve them), but I haven’t written them up yet, and Ed Keller, one of the speakers at tonight’s event, asked the same question, and proposed the investigation of interactions of systems. (The two examples he gave that I can remember were the effects of gut bacteria on behavior (and potentially on the formation and propagation of thedes!) and a virus that caused tulip flowers to form in ways that became highly in demand, which gave rise to tulip mania.) A related question that also was asked: would distinct thedes and phyles still exist in post-scarcity conditions?
2. Another topic related to the first question that came up was the idea of neuroatypical secessionism, especially as it overlaps (or does not overlap) with tech secessionism of the Srinivasan and Tunney varieties. Neuroatypicality is probably more thedish than phyletic, insofar as thedistinction between thedish and phyletic refers to a distinction between social groups/cultures/sets of norms/identities that are unlikely to be passed down from parent to child (rationalism, juggalos, goths, etc.) and social groups/etc. that can be passed down across the generations. (The most useful distinction to make with those words is another unanswered question; here I use my most recent working definition.) Is merely thedish secession possible? (‘Merely’ because every phyle is (probably) a thede.) Would it have different dynamics than phyletic secession? What about the possibility of temporary or limited merely-thedish secession, like rationalist group houses or Burning Man? (What about secession that is neither thedish nor phyletic, that is motivated not by those ‘hot’ factors, but rather by ‘cold’ factors like economic benefit? One of the speakers asked: are oil platforms seasteads?
3. Is there a life-cycle of empires or civilizations? If so, is the internal disharmony that underlies at least some of this talk of secession a sign, as John Glubb claims, of the decline of an empire—or even a cause of it? (It’s not hard to come up with a causal mechanism here: one side of an internal conflict could ally with an external agent against its domestic opponent.) If it’s not that, what is it? (It could just be an effect of population increase, to give one alternative.)
4. How about that internet-based nation-building that might be happening as we speak? This internal disharmony is not exactly a new problem; how was it addressed before? Surely not completely by repression. Marinetti talked about Italy a lot, for example; what did this mean in his context? (Also, see below about the Progressive Era and FDR’s cultural programs.) For that matter, most nations had to be imagined into being. Parts of the art world are apparently becoming interested in both internet culture and talk of secessionism, but I hear there’s not much they can do with it. Are there more possibilities for them than they think?—because picking up on this process can be one. (Usonian Futurism, anyone?)
5. Where do the current American automythologies come from? Do they come from pre-existing ethnic distinctions (as Woodard says), pre-existing religious distinctions amplified by the dynamics of democracy (as Moldbug says), or something else? In particular, what were the roles of the Progressive Era and the Cold War? The former could be read as an attempt at American nationalism/nation-building, where ‘American’ is to be contrasted with ‘Usonian’ (though the New Deal made some effort to record some aspects of folk culture); the latter is something that kontextmaschine has written about, but I suspect there’s more going on than that.
Take decolonization. Colonialism was very bad; we all learned that in school, and so we inferred that decolonization was very good. But if you look at what happened… first of all, isn’t it interesting that the USA took the opposite side from Britain, its supposedly most important ally, on that question, and the same side as the USSR? Second of all, isn’t it interesting that the USA and the USSR kept fighting over the newly decolonized countries? It’s not necessarily true that American cultural support for decolonization comes entirely from its own heritage, and not at all from geopolitical concerns.
But there are better examples, like abstract expressionism, which seems to be the official style of the government to this day, judging by how much of it they put on their walls. It’s now well known that the CIA supported it—and it, of course, had its reasons.
In 1947 the State Department organised and paid for a touring international exhibition entitled “Advancing American Art”, with the aim of rebutting Soviet suggestions that America was a cultural desert. But the show caused outrage at home, prompting Truman to make his Hottentot remark and one bitter congressman to declare: “I am just a dumb American who pays taxes for this kind of trash.” The tour had to be cancelled.
The US government now faced a dilemma. This philistinism, combined with Joseph McCarthy’s hysterical denunciations of all that was avant-garde or unorthodox, was deeply embarrassing. It discredited the idea that America was a sophisticated, culturally rich democracy. It also prevented the US government from consolidating the shift in cultural supremacy from Paris to New York since the 1930s. To resolve this dilemma, the CIA was brought in.
The connection is not quite as odd as it might appear. At this time the new agency, staffed mainly by Yale and Harvard graduates, many of whom collected art and wrote novels in their spare time, was a haven of liberalism when compared with a political world dominated by McCarthy or with J Edgar Hoover’s FBI. If any official institution was in a position to celebrate the collection of Leninists, Trotskyites and heavy drinkers that made up the New York School, it was the CIA.
Until now there has been no first-hand evidence to prove that this connection was made, but for the first time a former case officer, Donald Jameson, has broken the silence. Yes, he says, the agency saw Abstract Expressionism as an opportunity, and yes, it ran with it.
“Regarding Abstract Expressionism, I’d love to be able to say that the CIA invented it just to see what happens in New York and downtown SoHo tomorrow!” he joked. “But I think that what we did really was to recognise the difference. It was recognised that Abstract Expression- ism was the kind of art that made Socialist Realism look even more stylised and more rigid and confined than it was. And that relationship was exploited in some of the exhibitions.
“In a way our understanding was helped because Moscow in those days was very vicious in its denunciation of any kind of non-conformity to its own very rigid patterns. And so one could quite adequately and accurately reason that anything they criticised that much and that heavy- handedly was worth support one way or another.”
If it happened once, it’s likely to have happened other times. What other effects did the Cold War have here? And what about the end of it, the end of the necessity to unite against a common enemy? (Yes, common. When Harvard went Communist, it went Maoist.)